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ABSTRACT
The development of genetically modified (GM) agricultural products requires 
new policies to manage potential food safety and environmental risks.  The policy 
positions taken to date on GM foods by the United States and the European Union are 
very  different.  The  US  has  few  restrictions  on  production  and  trade  in  GM  food 
products and no costly labelling requirements, whereas the EU has close to a ban on 
the production and importation of GM foods. This paper seeks to explain (a) why both 
the US and EU policies are extreme in the light of the uncertainty about the risks 
associated with GM foods, (b) what their consequences are for income distribution 
and trade in farm products, and (c) what it means for the GM policies and economic 
welfare of people in other (particularly developing) countries.  In this paper we use the 
GTAP  global  economy  wide  model  to  estimate  the  extent  of  the  trade,  national 
welfare and income distributional effects of the actual policy choices of the US and 
the EU as compared with what they would be if GM products were adopted with less-
distortionary GM policies. The distributional effects are used to also shed light on 
why the US and EU have adopted such different sub-optimal GM policies.
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WHY ARE US AND EU POLICIES TOWARD
GMOs SO DIFFERENT?
Lee Ann Jackson and Kym Anderson
The development of genetically modified (GM) agricultural products is bringing 
new dimensions to global science and technology policy, international standards setting, 
and global trade policy. Some groups believe GM products require new types of oversight 
to reduce potential environmental and food safety risks associated with their production 
and/or consumption, including restrictions on their international trade. Yet other groups 
who believe that environmental and food safety risks are low criticize policies that reduce 
trade  in  these  products  for  being  very  costly  and  perhaps  illegal.
1  Reconciling  those 
groups’ differing viewpoints in international fora is essential if the full global benefits 
from creating and adopting the new technologies and thereby lowering food costs are to 
be reaped without incurring excessive environmental and food safety risks. 
The European Union and the United States have very different policy positions 
regarding the production, use and trade of agricultural biotechnology products.  The EU 
has imposed a moratorium on the import and introduction of these products because it 
claims these products represent undetermined risks to the food safety and environmental 
health  of  member  countries.
2      In  contrast,  the  US  has  widely  adopted  GM  crops 
following their first approval in the mid-1990s.  In the US consumer resistance to these 
crops has developed only gradually and remains much lower than in the EU.
While  the  US  and  EU  GM  regulatory  policies  differ  dramatically,  they  have 
similar impacts on domestic farmers. In the case of the US, farmers are already supported 
in numerous ways such as via production and export subsidies, and the present stance of 
minimalist regulation of GM production and consumption simply adds to that economic 
support  through not  raising costs  of production and marketing or lowering consumer 
demand. In the EU the situation is slightly more complicated. Certainly a ban on GM 
production prevents EU farmers from taking advantage of the new technology. But if the 
technology would always be of less advantage to those farmers on their small farms and 
in close proximity to populations concerned about the natural environment, they would 
find it difficult to catch up with adoption in less-densely populated countries, particularly 
the US. In that case, a ban on imports of soybean and maize from countries using GM 
technology has the prospect of providing EU farmers economic protection from import 
competition that may more than offset any potential extra profit from being able to adopt 
GM technology. 
Labelling has been proposed as a possible solution to the impasse between these 
two regulatory approaches. Economists argue that labels efficiently address the imbalance 
between information controlled by producers and information desired by consumers. In 
                                                
1 Trade restrictions are costly not only for the usual comparative static reasons but also because they reduce 
the incentive to produce and exploit new biotechnologies; and they may be illegal to the extent that they 
contravene international trade agreements, most notably under the WTO.
2 In October 2002 the European Union adopted tough regulations on authorising imports of new GM crops.  
However, EU member country governments are unlikely to support new crop approvals without additional 
rules requiring identity preservation of GM products (Financial Times 2002).4
theory, if products that contain GM content are labelled as such, those consumers that are 
averse to GM technologies can avoid them while consumers who are close to indifferent 
will base their consumption more on relative prices than GM content.  
The purpose of this paper is to disentangle the various incentives that exist within 
national economies to accept or reject the import of GM products.  The results reported 
here are based on simulations using the GTAP model (see Hertel 1997 for a complete 
description of this model).  The GTAP model provides information on the economic 
implications of productivity increases, import bans and labelling regulations.  The results 
from these simulations are used to estimate distributional impacts within the EU and US 
economies.  As  explained  in  the  first  section,  this  is  a  necessary  first  step  for 
understanding the political economy of GM policy choices.  The next section provides 
details of the GTAP policy simulations, including structural changes to the model and 
assumptions made for three policy simulations.  The following section uses a political 
economic  approach  to  interpret  simulation  results  and  to  analyse  national  regulatory 
incentives.  The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these policy 
incentives for global trade in GM products.  
The standard theory
GM food crops pose two separate types of risks.  First, the production of these 
crops may alter the healthy functioning of natural ecosystems, for example by generating 
negative externalities in the form of increased pesticide resistance. They may also may 
cross-pollinate with neighbouring conventional or organic crops, making it difficult for 
producers of non-GM crops to claim their product is GM-free. Second, because these 
products contain new combinations of genes, they may also present new types of food 
safety  risks  for  consumers,  including  through  the  introduction  of  allergenic  material.  
Those who perceive these products to be radically different from traditional products 
prefer to avoid consuming them.  
Even if a private-sector Coasian solution between the parties cannot be reached, 
the theory of regulation suggests efficient ways to address these concerns. In the case of 
negative production externalities, the introduction of an appropriate tax could be devised 
to encourage producers to constrain their production to the socially optimal level (Baumol 
and Oates 1988). On the consumption side, the primary concern is that consumers do not 
have full information about the content of the goods they are consuming. The GM content 
of  a  product  can  be  thought  of  as  a  credence  characteristic  –  a  characteristic  that 
consumers cannot perceive directly though taste, smell or touch (Nelson 1970). Labelling 
systems,  through  providing  information  to  consumers  on  these  types  of  credence 
characteristics,  provide  an  efficient  way  to  address  the  problem  of  insufficient 
information.
Regulatory  regimes  in  the  EU  and  the  US  have  not  adopted  either  of  these 
approaches.  In the US, GM production proceeds with minimal intervention: farmers are 
not required to segregate GM crops from conventional varieties, and labelling has been 
emphatically denounced, particularly by industry actors (New York Times 2003).  From 
an efficiency viewpoint then the US regulatory system may lead to over-production of 
these crops and an under-provision of information to consumers. In the EU, on the other 
hand, production of GM crops is all but banned and a strict labelling regime requires 
labels for all products that contain greater than 0.9% GM content (Stamps 2002).  These 
high standards may mean that many products carry such labels as “may contain GMOs”, 
information that is of little value to consumers.  Thus, the EU regulatory regime leads to 5
sub-optimal  levels  of  GM  crop  production  and  an  inefficient  mechanism  for  product 
differentiation for consumers.
The divergence in regulatory approaches between the US and the EU is puzzling, 
given the many similarities of these economies. Most analysts have argued that these 
differences stem from fundamental differences in consumer attitudes and expectations 
(e.g., Bernauer and Miens 2001). We know that consumers, even with the support of
environmental groups, are traditionally weak trade policy lobbyists relative to producer 
groups (Anderson and Hayami 1986; Hillman 1989). This paper therefore explores the 
hypothesis  that  differences  in  US  and  EU farmers’ interests provide an additional or 
alternative explanation. It does so by examining distributional effects of actual policies to 
see if they can shed light on these differing GM policy choices.  
Simulating GM agricultural policies
The global, economy-wide GTAP model can capture the effects of productivity 
increases of GM crops, of consumer aversion to consuming GM products, and of the 
substitutability of GM and non-GM products as intermediate inputs into final consumable 
food. The version used here was adapted by Stone et al. (2002) and is aggregated to 9 
regions, 13 sectors, and four types of factors: agricultural land, non-human capital, skilled 
labour  and  basic  (unskilled)  labour.  Non-human  capital  and  both  types of labour are 
assumed to be perfectly mobile within the economy, while land is assumed to be sector-
specific.  
Data on global adoption of GM technologies show a wide divergence in adoption 
across countries (see James 2002). Therefore, the GTAP model includes assumptions 
about the level of GM adoption in countries. In these GTAP simulations 40% of North 
American (NA) coarse grain production and 65% of its oilseed production is assumed to 
be GM. In contrast, only 10% of EU coarse grains and oilseed production is assumed to 
be GM. These are conservative estimates of current levels of GM adoption in NA and 
probably over-estimate current levels of EU adoption but they reflect estimates by James 
(2002). In addition, 10% of coarse grains and oilseed production in Australia, China, 
Japan, and Korea and 15% of coarse grains and oilseed production in the Rest of the 
World are assumed to be GM. Neither the Middle East nor New Zealand is assumed to 
produce GM crops.
To distinguish GM from non-GM productivity, the coarse grain oilseeds sectors 
are each sub-divided into GM and non-GM product and an output augmenting, Hicks 
neutral,  productivity  shock  is  implemented  on  the  GM  component  of  these  two 
commodities to capture their higher productivity.
3  This assumes that GM technology 
uniformly reduces the level of primary factors and intermediate inputs needed per unit of 
output.
4  
In  the  CES  production  nest,  producers  choose  first  between  imported  and 
domestic inputs, and then choose whether or not to use GM or non-GM intermediate 
inputs in their production of final goods. This model structure supports the analysis of 
segregated markets in our scenario that examines mutual adoption of a labelling system.
                                                
3 GM wheat and rice are yet to be widely commercialised and so are not considered in our analysis.
4 Because it makes little difference to the results being analysed here, we simply follow previous analysts in 
assuming that the productivity effects of genetic modification do not differ across crops or inputs. See 
Nielsen and Anderson (2001), Nielsen, Theirfelder and Robinson (2001) and Van Meijl and van Tongeren 
(2002).  6
In order to capture consumer aversion to GM products, two changes are made to 
the traditional GTAP demand structure.  First, elasticities of substitution between GM 
and non-GM products are set at low levels to capture the perceived low substitutability of 
these products.  In addition, preference shift parameters are included to capture the group 
of consumers that, because of food safety or environmental concerns, refuse to consume 
GM crops regardless of their price.
GTAP provides a comprehensive decomposition of changes in national economic 
welfare as measured by the equivalent variation in income. However, national and world 
measures of welfare changes ignore the distributional implications within countries of 
GM policies. They therefore fail to provide insights into the potential political economy 
of  GM  policy  choices.  While  the  total  benefits  from  trade  decrease  when  inefficient 
policies such as import bans are implemented, some groups within national economies 
will be beneficiaries. Hence further assumptions about the intra-national distribution of 
factor ownership are required to disaggregate GTAP welfare measures (see below). 
Three separate policy simulations were conducted to examine the impact of GM 
regulations.  
Scenario 1:  Selected regions adopt GM grain and oilseeds
The first scenario captures the effects of productivity shocks on GM technologies.  
This scenario represents the base case conditions in which some countries have adopted 
GM coarse grain and oilseeds and experienced productivity increases from these crops, in 
the  absence  of  any  policies  to  control  the  adoption,  importation  or  labelling  of  GM 
products.  Following  Stone  et  al.  (2002),  these  model  simulations  assume  that  GM 
oilseeds have a 6% productivity gain and GM coarse grains have a 7.5% productivity 
gain.
Scenario 2:  Accompanying GM adoption in selected regions an EU moratorium on GM 
products is introduced
The  second  scenario  is  the  same  as  scenario  1  except  it  assumes  that  this 
productivity shock occurs in conjunction with an EU moratorium on GM imports from 
North America (NA). Under this scenario there is no segregation between GM and non-
GM products and therefore the import ban is imposed upon all coarse grains and oilseeds 
from NA. Hence, this  scenario is  modelled by increasing the tariff on imports of all 
coarse grains and oilseeds from NA to the EU to a prohibitive level. Similar simulations 
were conducted looking at impacts of a moratorium imposed also by Japan, Korea and 
Australasia. The moratorium by this extended group of countries simply leads to similar 
(albeit larger) impacts, and so that experiment is not reported here.
Scenario  3:  Accompanying  GM  adoption  in  selected  regions  a  labelling  system  is 
adopted in the US and the EU
The  third  scenario  is  as  for  scenario  1  except  it  assumes  the  EU  and  North 
America implement labelling policies that allow consumers to choose between non-GM 
products and those that may contain GM content.  In this scenario all countries adopt 
labelling regulations and diehard consumers in the EU, Australia, New Zealand, Korea 
and Japan avoid consuming coarse grains and oilseeds.
5  This is modelled by a 25% 
                                                
5 In this simulation, segregation is assumed to be not required for labelling. Products from countries that 
produce  both  GM  and  non-GM  grains  and  oilseeds  label  their  products  “may  contain  GMOs.”  This 
assumption  reflects  the  difficulty  in  credibly  segregating  bulk  commodities  such  as  coarse  grains  into 7
reduction in final consumption of coarse grains and oilseeds in those countries from all 
sources.
Effects of GM regulatory policies
National welfare effects
Table 1 shows that global welfare increases in the first scenario by US$ 2.5 billion 
per year.  In the strongly GM-adopting region of North America these gains in economic 
welfare are primarily due to the GM-induced productivity changes, although there is a 
small offsetting terms of trade effect. By way of contrast, in the EU more than half of the 
(much smaller) welfare gains come for improvements in allocative efficiency. This is 
mainly because subsidized agricultural sectors contract in the wake of increased import 
competition from NA. 
In the second scenario which models the EU ban on GM imports, world welfare 
results decrease by US$ 0.35 billion per year.  This is partly because the EU import ban 
encourages higher-cost grain and oilseed production in the EU to expand so much that its 
welfare loss from increased resource inefficiency more than outweighs the welfare gain 
from the new technology. And in NA the gain from the new technology is offset by a 
larger effect of an adverse terms of trade change following the EU import ban plus an 
allocative  efficiency  loss  (because  farm  resources  move  from  lightly  assisted  coarse 
grains and oilseeds to  more-heavily assisted crops). Notice also that China and other 
developing countries gain more in this scenario because of better terms of trade.
6 The EU 
is the only region to experience a net welfare decline with the moratorium, but the benefit 
of the technology to NA is much diminished as compared with Scenario 1, through its 
greater adverse terms of trade change.
In the third scenario, labelling regulations provide an alternative mechanism for 
managing the introduction of GM technology. Results indicate that both NA and the EU 
benefit  from  the  adoption  of  labelling  regulations  as  compared  with  the  policy 
environment in which the EU has imposed a moratorium. In the EU this is driven by a 
large positive change in allocative efficiency instead of a negative one as in Scenario 2. In 
NA this result is due to the combined (small) positive allocative efficiency effect and the 
smaller negative terms of trade impact.  
Distributive effects within nations
Assumptions concerning the economic characteristics of groups of agents within 
the various economies allow preliminary disaggregation of the above aggregated national 
welfare measures. Economies are assumed to be composed of three groups of households: 
farmers, basic wage earners, and owners of human and other capital. Income of each 
group comes from a combination of factors. Farm households earn income from farm and 
non-farm activities. GTAP data provide information on factor income shares for farm 
income  in  farm  households.  Factor  income  shares  for  non-farm  activities  of  farm 
households are assumed to be the same as those for other capital owners. The shares of 
                                                                                                                                                
separate GM and conventional product streams. US policy makers often cite these types of difficulties to 
justify  their  aversion  to  identity  preservation  schemes.    Since  this  simulation  does  not  examine  the 
implications of identity preservation then, unlike in (Stone et al. 2002), it does not include segregation 
costs.  
6 However, bear in mind the point made in footnote 1 above, namely, that this comparative static result 
ignores the fact that the EU moratorium is dampening the incentive to invest in GM technology, including 
for developing countries.8
farm household income from non-farm activities is assumed to be 90% in Japan and 
Korea, 50% in China and the EU, 35% in NA, 25% in Australasia, and 20% in other 
developing countries. Basic wage earners receive all their income from unskilled nonfarm 
labour. Capital owners earn most of their income from skilled labour and other non-farm 
capital.  
GTAP model results provide estimates of changes in factor rewards following a 
shock which, in conjunction with factor income shares, allows calculations of nominal 
income  changes  for  each group. The  former are shown  in  Table  2.  Rewards to  land 
decrease in all cases except in Scenario 2 for the EU when it imposes its import ban.  
However, in that EU moratorium case wages and capital returns decrease, whereas they 
increase in the other two scenarios (as they do for NA).
Table 3 presents the nominal and real income changes for each type of household 
under  each  scenario.  The  nominal  income  changes  draw  from  Table  2  plus  the 
assumptions about the sources of income for the different types of households. The real 
income changes subtract from the nominal changes the change in the cost of living, given 
the shares of expenditure on the various products in each economy (taken from the GTAP 
data base). NA farmers lose from the new technology, which is a not-uncommon result 
when  the  shock  affects  a  large  share  of  global  production  of  products  whose  price 
elasticity  of  demand is  low. They  lose slightly more when labelling were then to  be 
introduced, but very much more with the EU moratorium (row 1 of Table 3). The real 
incomes of basic wage earners and other non-farm households go up however, and by just 
as  much  regardless  of  policy  responses  abroad.  Little  wonder,  then,  that  NA  farmer 
groups are the ones lobbying heavily against regulatory policies at home and abroad, and 
especially the EU moratorium. If accepting labelling is the price to pay for getting rid of 
the import ban, then it is not surprising that NA farmers would go along with that since, 
according to the income effects in Table 3, that would be almost as good for them as 
having no regulatory policies.
Row 4 of Table 3 shows that EU farmers lose from GM technology when there 
are no policy responses, and lose even more if labelling is introduced. When the EU 
import ban is in place, however, they gain substantially. In that latter case the EU’s non-
farm households are shown to lose income, but recall that our welfare measure does not 
take account of the utility associated with the knowledge that in the moratorium case 
consumers ahve greater assurance that they are buying GM-free food. If the latter effect 
on welfare more than compensates for the loss in spending power shown in Table 3 then 
it is understandable that that group of EU households (or at least the most concerned 
among them) would support farmers in lobbying for the ban to remain in place. But note 
from the final column of Table 3 that non-farm households in the EU would be much 
better off if labelling replaced the moratorium. It is the most zealous opponents of GMOs 
that tend to be in the active lobbying groups, however, so they may continue to hold out 
along with farmers to try to maintain the status quo even though it is less beneficial and 
possibly even harmful for the masses of consumers/voters they often claim to represent.
Developing  country  farm  households  lose  slightly  from  the  new  technology’s 
adoption by NA except when the EU moratorium is in place. The loss results from the 
lower price of coarse grains and oilseeds in international markets and hence lower returns 
to their land, and it changes to a real income gain when the EU bans imports from NA 
because developing countries can then export more to the EU in lieu of NA. The boost to 
real incomes of non-farm households in developing countries results not only from lower 
food prices but also a greater demand for their factors of production, because the non-
farm sector expands when farm output declines in developing countries because of the 9
improved competitiveness of GM-adopting countries. That boost in non-farm household 
incomes is least under the EU moratorium though – and would be even lower when one 
takes into account the fact that the EU’s moratorium policy is dampening multinational 
investments in new GM technologies for developing countries.
7
In  short,  these  results  are  not  inconsistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  producer 
interests are influencing GM policy choices in both the US and EU.
Consequences for Trade
Both GM productivity shocks and the EU ban on imports of GM products alter 
the distribution of exports. Table 4 presents the changes in the share of each region’s 
exports that go to particular import markets (for brevity’s sake other OECD countries are 
not  shown).  Comparing  the  trade  distribution  of Scenario 1 with  the pre-shock trade 
distribution  we  can  see  that  the  trade  distribution  does  not  change  discernably  (even 
though volumes traded are larger). The same is true if labelling is applied. When the EU 
imposes a moratorium, however, the GM-adopting NA countries lose their markets in the 
EU which allows non-adopting developing countries to experience an increase in exports 
to the EU (and a commensurate reduction in the share of their exports to other developing 
countries which are supplied more from NA).  In addition, exports among EU countries 
also increase under the ban on imports from NA, while their exports to the rest of the 
world including to developing countries are reduced.  
Conclusion
The  simulations  described  here  provide  a  preliminary  indication  of  the  intra-
national distributional (as well as bilateral trade impacts) of GM policies. The results 
suggest that agricultural households in the EU benefit disproportionately from bans on 
GM products from NA, and that US farm households benefit more from the current NA 
policy than they would under labelling. This result supports the hypothesis that producer 
interests,  not  just  differences  in  consumer  attitudes,  may  be  behind  the  current  sub-
optimal policy settings affecting GM coarse grains and oilseeds in the US and EU.
                                                
7 In a follow-up paper we will examine the additional impact of first China and then also other developing 
countries joining NA in embracing GM coarse grain and oilseed technologies. China’s adoption has been 
examined  by  Anderson  and  Yao  (2004)  but  their  analysis  focused  only  on  its  impact  on  production, 
consumption and trade, not on aggregate national welfare or its distribution.10
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Table 1: Decomposition of global economic welfare impacts of GM adoption without and 
with policy responses
                                                        (US$ million)
Equivalent Variation







NA 1243 28 -161 1376
EU 368 201 47 120
Australia+New Zealand -15 1 -22 6
Japan+Korea 173 35 132 5
China 146 22 17 107
Other DCs
a 587 76 -14 524
Total 2502
With EU moratorium response
NA 358 -321 -662 1358
EU -2148 -2341 54 127
Australia+New Zealand 9 3 0 6
Japan+Korea 253 42 211 5
China 175 37 28 107
Other DCs
a 994 88 368 531
Total -358
With labelling response
NA 1189 5 -190 1375
EU 518 334 65 119
Australia+New Zealand -23 3 -32 6
Japan+Korea -30 -177 142 5
China 161 28 26 107
Other DCs
a 604 91 -11 524
Total 2420
a Includes Middle East, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
Source: Authors’ GTAP model results13
Table 2: Percentage change in factor prices in North America and the EU under three 
scenarios









NA -2.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
EU -1.12 0.00 0.01 0.01
With EU moratorium response
NA -2.99 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02
EU 9.58 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05
With labelling response 
NA -2.15 0.03 0.04 0.03
EU -2.13 0.01 0.02 0.01
Source: Authors’ GTAP model results14
 Table 3: Percentage change in nominal and real household incomes














Farmers -0.13 -0.25 -0.14 -0.12 -0.19 -0.13
Unskilled Labour 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
Capital Owners 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04
EU
Farmers -0.03 0.30 -0.07 -0.03 0.23 -0.05
Unskilled Labour 0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.02 -0.12 0.03
Capital Owners 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.10 0.02
China
Farmers -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00
Unskilled Labour 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
Capital Owners 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04
Other DCs
Farmers -0.03 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.02
Unskilled Labour 0.15 0.05 0.21 0.18 0.05 0.23
Capital Owners 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.11
Source:  Authors’ GTAP model results15
Table 4: Network of trade in coarse grains and oilseeds 
(percentage of each region’s total exports of these products




NA 15 13 23
EU 3 72 24
DCs 3 23 33
Without any policy response
NA 15 13 23
EU 3 72 24
DCs 3 23 33
With EU moratorium response
NA 17 1 27
EU 2 78 19
DCs 3 34 29
With labelling response
NA 15 13 23
EU 3 72 24
DCs 2 23 33
Source:  Authors’ GTAP model results